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PAUL P. STREETEN 
 
The paper argues against the currently fashionable case for “state minimalism”. It 
argues for a strong, activist state, though operating on a different basis and in different 
areas from the many recently failed interventionist states and many developing countries. 
The paper seeks to rescue alternative perspectives, such as the importance of the 
“civil society” that cuts across national boundaries. Global participation is examined. 
“Market-friendly” interventions are welcomed only if they are “people-friendly”. The 
role of the civil society, the problems of the post-socialist countries and the role of the 
fashionable slogans privatisation, liberalisation, deregulation and decentralisation are 
analysed. These are seen to call for many qualifications. The links between democracy, 
capitalism and development are reviewed. The social capital of trust and reciprocity that 
is invested in norms and networks of civic life is seen as a vital factor of effective 
government and economic progress. Should economic reform precede political reform in 
the countries in transition? Some lessons can be learned for the developing countries 
from the countries in transition. An analysis of the politics and the political economy of 
development aid follow. Buffers between donors and recipients are suggested, such as 
mutual monitoring of each other’s performance by recipients, a council of wise men and 
women, or a secretariat with genuinely global loyalties. A quiet style in aid-giving is also 
an option, when potential improvers are rewarded, without the imposition of 
conditionality. The paper then goes on to a presentation of various theories of the state. 
A non-maximising theory is recommended. It ends with a set of policy conclusions for 
governments and for aid agencies. 
 
 “Global governance” and “the international community” are words that can 
be used to conceal rather than reveal meanings. Many sins are committed in the 
name of “global governance”. They are part of diplomacy by language, used to 
“dignify the sordid processes of international politics”.
1 
  It was politically difficult to complain about corruption, mismanagement, 
and the abuses of authoritarian regimes, especially in Africa, without giving offence. 
So a new term was invented whose meaning in relation to the more old-fashioned 
“government” is not entirely clear. The American Heritage Dictionary defines 
governance as “the act, process or power of governing; government;” the Oxford 
English Dictionary as “the act or manner of governing, of exercising control or 
authority over the actions of subjects; a system of regulations”. The International 
Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences has no entry for “governance,” nor does the 
term appear in its index. 
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Perhaps the widest definition of governance is given in the Report of the 
Commission on Global Governance “Our Global Neighbourhood”.
2 “Governance is 
the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage 
their common affairs. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse 
interests may be accommodated and co-operative action may be taken. It includes 
formal institutions and regimes empowered to enforce compliance, as well as 
informal arrangements that people and institutions either have agreed to or perceive 
to be in their interest”. 
The late Göran Ohlin wrote in the context of international cooperation, “what 
some may have in mind is a vague notion of something less than government but 
more than chaos—regimes of the kind that already exist for many purposes”.
3 But 
one could also interpret it as meaning more than government: including not only 
global, central, provincial (or, in a federation, state) and local government, but also 
relations with the civil society, the private profit-seeking sector, the market, the 
family, and the individual citizen, in so far as these relations bear on governing a 
society. That civil society and civic culture (as it has evolved through hundred years) 
are particularly important for good governance is shown for Italy by Robert D. 
Putnam’s excellent book Making Democracy Work.
4 He shows that what he calls 
civic “norms and networks of social engagement” facilitate the working of 
democracy. The social capital of trust and reciprocity that is invested in norms and 
networks of civic life is seen as a vital factor of effective government and economic 
progress. That the market is an important institution of governance does not need 
stressing nowadays. 
Cultural factors, too, determine, as well as are determined by, governance. I 
shall interpret governance in this wider sense and begin with some remarks on 
participation in global government, and then proceed downwards to national 
government, including a discussion of the links between democracy and capitalism 
and the problems of transition, to decentralisation to local government, and to the 
civil society. Next I shall return to the international aspects of governance and finally 
discuss briefly various theories of the state, selecting one as the most realistic. 
 
GLOBAL PARTICIPATION 
There is an important international civil society that cuts across national 
boundaries: NGOs, churches, professional organisations, international trade unions, 
interest groups, citizens’ groups, grassroots organisations, action groups, etc., 
although they do not wield ultimate authority. But they, too, can commit their 
members. And there are, of course, the multinational corporations and international 
banks. How can the UN agencies and other international and regional organisations 
2Our Global Neighbourhood (1995). 
3Ohlin (1994). 
4Putnam with Leonardi and Nanetti (1993). Governance  357
become more responsive to the demands and needs of the global civil society and 
more participatory? We hear a lot about the need for greater participation, but the 
international organisations preaching this gospel have not been outstanding in 
practising what they preach. It has something to do with the blind spot of auto-
professionalism, a subject on which I keep a secret file. It contains facts and 
reflections about dentists’ children having bad teeth, marriage guidance consellors 
suffering from broken marriages, management experts being unable to manage their 
own affairs, evaluators never evaluating their own activities, the auditors of the 
Royal Economic Society having to refuse to audit its books and economists, who 
make their living by telling everyone what is efficient, have not figured out whether 
their own educational process is efficient. The International Labour Organisation is 
unique in the United Nations family in that it already contains the germs of 
participation. It is not, like many others, just an inter-governmental body, but its 
tripartite structure consists of the representatives of workers and employers as well. 
We also have heard a lot recently about the need to decentralise government 
(about which more below) and to draw more on participatory organisations in the 
political arena. The world has found unworkable and has rejected the process of 
centralised decision-making in centrally planned economies. But the very same 
process governs the relations between management and labour within both capitalist 
and public sector firms. We know that under regimentation people do not give their 
best. Democracy and participation should be introduced not only in politics but also 
in the private sector; and not only in government and in profit-seeking firms, but also 
in private voluntary societies and non-governmental organisations such as trade 
unions and churches; even in some families there is a need for greater participation, or 
at least better access to those in power, particularly by women and in some areas by 
children. This might be called vertical participation: to make the membership of these 
agencies more responsive to the needs of all its members through a higher degree of 
participation and access to power. By horizontal participation I mean the inclusion in 
the international organisations of some representatives of the civil society. 
With the end of the Cold War, the role of the United Nations and its agencies 
can once again become what it was intended to be at its foundation, but with 
adaptation to the new power constellations of the present world. Japan and Germany 
should be given bigger roles. They should be encouraged to take positive initiatives 
in raising resources, and in the many activities surrounding various aspects of human 
security. Peace-keeping and peace-making applies to military and territorial security; 
President Clinton talks of personal security and health security; food security is the 
mandate of the FAO; financial security that of the International Monetary Fund, the 
World Bank, and the regional development banks, environmental security that of the 
United Nations Environment Programme and job and income security that of the 
ILO. The creation of productive, remunerative, secure, satisfying, freely chosen jobs 
should be a top priority for policy-makers. Paul P. Streeten  358
Democracy, Capitalism and Development 
A commonsense definition of democracy runs in terms of two institutions: 
regular, free elections and a body of civil rights (as well as responsibilities). Both 
institutions limit the power of the state: the first by ensuring that the rascals can be 
thrown out of office, the second by making sure that the rascals cannot do certain 
things even while in office.
5 Civil rights also protect minorities against the 
dictatorship of the majority. 
Does democracy require a market economy, and does a market economy 
require democracy? The answer to the first question is yes, for there are no 
democracies that are not market economies, although the admixture of public 
ownership, management and regulation varies widely; the answer to the second 
question is no, for there are many market economies that are not democracies. 
What are the connections between democracy, human rights and freedom on 
the one hand and development or economic growth on the other? There is a large and 
growing literature on the links between freedom and economic growth. Vernon 
Ruttan draws on the political science literature (especially Samuel P. Huntington and 
Jorge I. Dominguez) and concludes that at early stages they are incompatible.
6 The 
view is widespread that the tough measures necessary for successful development 
call for discipline and resistance to the pressures of special interest groups which can 
be provided only by authoritarian governments. The Human Development Report 
1991
7 rejects this and shows that freedom and democracy, though not a necessary 
condition, are entirely consistent with growth and development, even at low levels. It 
compares the Human Freedom Index with the economic indicators. It is true that 
Japan’s success and the East Asian “miracles” were not built by democratic 
governments. From this some have argued that democracy and human rights are a 
luxury that countries embarking on development cannot afford. This is what the 
killings of Tiananmen Square wanted to impress on 1.2 billion Chinese. But these 
experiences do not prove that authoritarian government was a necessary condition 
for the success of these countries. Their success depended on land reforms, mass 
education, and the timely switch to labour-intensive exports. Also, their experience is 
limited to a few countries and a relatively short period. Atul Kohli has also shown 
that the growth rates of democracies have not been lower than those of undemocratic 
regimes.
8 The USA in the 19th century, and more recently Israel, Venezuela, 
Malaysia, Cost Rica, Mauritius and Botswana have done well economically, while 
remaining democracies. Historically, economic progress has occurred in non-
dictatorial societies: ancient Athens, the Roman Republic, the North Italian city 
states, the Netherlands in the 17th century, and Great Britain after the Glorious 
5See Berger (1992). 
6Ruttan (1991). 
7UNDP (1991). 
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Revolution of 1688-89, as well as the United Sates in the 19th century. Adam 
Przeworski’s and Fernando Limongi’s careful review of the theoretical and statistical 
arguments of 18 studies of the links between political regimes and growth is 
inconclusive. “We do not know whether democracy fosters or hinders economic 
growth.”
9  
A study edited by John Williamson
10 looked at thirteen cases of radical reform 
in rich and poor countries (trade liberalisation, drastic changes in taxes and public
  
spending) and found that six of the successfully reforming governments were   
“unambiguously democratic”: (Australia in 1983, Colombia in 1989, New Zealand in 
1984, Poland in 1990, Portugal in 1985 and Spain in 1982). Surjit Bhalla subjects 90 
countries to an econometric analysis for the relation between various kinds of 
freedom. He finds that civil and political freedoms promote economic growth. He 
ranks countries in a seven-mark scale, and concludes that, other things being equal, 
an improvement by one mark in civil and political freedom raises annual growth per 
head by roughly a full percentage point.
11 It is often said that property rights, a 
necessary condition for economic growth, are securer in democracies and that these 
are less grasping than autocracies.
12 But how much private property, as opposed to 
public property, and how much state intervention are essential conditions for a 
democratic market economy to work is not known. 
In an interesting paper Nauro Campos reviews some of the empirical literature 
on the relation between democracy and development and concludes that there is a 
significant positive effect of democracy on development via education and, 
surprisingly, investment.
13 Chatterji, and Hilmore, Strunk and Vanasin (1993) find 
that politically free regimes in Asia have higher growth rates of real income per head 
than in other regions. 
The connection between democracy and capitalism is, however, not as that 
painted by ideologues of capitalism. When the invisible hand of the market causes 
suffering through excessive unemployment or exploitation or environmental 
degradation, democracy demands interventions with the free market. There is no 
evidence whatsoever that these interventions are bound to lead to slavery and 
despotism, as Friedrich von Hayek predicted. On the other hand, the owners and 
managers of private firms attempt to restrain democracy when it claims too many 
resources for mass consumption. 
9Przeworski and Limongi (1993). The studies investigated are also listed in Adam Przeworski 
(1992). 
10Williamson (ed.) (1994). 
11Bhalla (n.d.) 
12See Olson (1993). In the nineteenth century it was widely thought that democracy would destroy 
private property, for the majority of the poor would vote to expropriate the rich. Other explanations of the 
link between the market economy and democracy include the provision of: “the social space” for a civil 
society [Peter Berger (1992)] and the possibility of political dissent [(Bhagwati 1992)]. 
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Economic growth is the product of the rate of investment and its productivity. 
Early writers emphasised the importance of stepping up the investment rate, and 
some dictatorship may have had an advantage there. The economic performance of 
Chile under the pro-market dictatorship of Pinochet, of South Korea under Park and 
Chun, of Taiwan under Chiang Kai-Shek and his son, of Singapore under Lee, and of 
the People’s Republic of China under Deng seem to prove it. The choice between 
what was thought to be freedom and economic growth used to be called “the cruel 
choice”. Later, as the emphasis shifted to the productivity of investment, 
democracies could provide better incentives and institutions, and mobilise people’s 
enterprise and initiative.
14 More recently, the interdependence between the 
investment rate and its productivity has been explored. 
What is, however, more important than attempts to show that freedom and 
democracy are consistent with good development performance, is the fact that 
human development (with improved health and education, as well as higher 
incomes) and economic growth (with the creation of a middle class) lead, sooner or 
later, to the irresistible call for freedom, as can be seen historically in Europe and 
today in East Asia, Eastern Europe, South Africa and Latin America. Even an 
aberration such as Hitler lasted for only twelve years. 
I should like to give Albert Hirschman the last word for the present on the 
complex relationship between democracy or political progress and development or 
economic progress. “What, then, is the point of my story? It is to affirm once again 
that political and economic progress are not tied together in any easy, 
straightforward, ‘functional’ way. There are the various on-and-off connections… 
Then there are stories, intricate and often nonrepeatable,… that look more like tricks 
history has up its sleeve than like social-scientific regularities, not to speak of laws. 
To make an inventory, to survey history’s repertoire of such tricks, seems to me an 




The current slogans in the economic area are privatisation, deregulation, 
liberalisation and decentralisation.
16 Privatisation and deregulation are intended to 
free people from the strangulating (or at best heavy) hand of the state, liberalisation 
is intended to subject trade to foreign competition and world prices, and 
decentralisation is intended to make administration cheaper, more transparent, more 
participatory, and more responsive to people’s needs. 
Privatisation  takes two different forms. It can consist in (1) transferring 
previously state-owned enterprises into private ownership, control and management; 
14Bhagwati (1992). 
15Hirschman (1994). 
16The comprehensive package of measures recommended to Eastern Europe is known as a 
programme of stabilisation, liberalisation, and privatisation. Stabilisation refers to a stable macro-
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and (2) encouraging the growth of new, normally initially small, private enterprises. 
The reason for privatisation is the inefficiency of many (though by no means all) 
public enterprises, and the heavy drain on public revenue their subsidies constitute. 
An additional benefit can be the absorption of the liquidity overhang in many ex-
socialist countries, if shares in the enterprise are sold and the receipts are not spent. 
In this way, inflationary pressures can be reduced. But the aim should not be to 
maximise receipts from the sale of assets, but rather to encourage competition and to 
harness private initiative. 
Certain conditions have to be met to make privatisation a success. In addition 
to the need for a capital market (which did not exist in the ex-socialist countries) 
there must be a competitive environment, so that public inefficiency is not just 
replaced by private inefficiency or by exploitation; or, if a monopoly is inevitable, it 
should be regulated. Privatisation without the right regulatory framework is bound to 
fail. The premature freeing of prices in Russia led to vast price increases, which did 
not lead to more production because protection rackets kept out new entrants and 
skimmed off large profits. Instead of securing property rights, after privatised assets 
had been stripped, the money was transferred abroad, helped by misguided 
liberalisation of capital flows. 
Competitive firms in Britain, such as Jaguar, Rolls Royce, British Petroleum, 
Trustees Savings Bank and British Airways have faced fewer problems being 
privatised than “natural monopolies” such as British Telecommunication, British Gas 
and the regional water companies. Corporate control created problems in the ex-
socialist countries which privatisation in the West did not face. The managers of the 
enterprises, freed from the control of Ministries, sought the perquisites of control 
rather than the rewards of ownership and enterprise. There was neither the Anglo-
Saxon control of management by capital markets (and take-over bids), nor the 
German-Japanese control by the dominant shareholding of banks and other financial 
institutions. Such controls are absent in Russian where shareholders are weak and 
dispersed. Without functioning capital and credit markets and without a soft budget 
constraint, efficient firms may be forced out of business for want of finance. 
For successful privatisation there must also be training facilities for the new 
entrepreneurs and the workers; there must be a legal framework for property 
rights; it is desirable that there should be a political consensus on privatisation, 
which, in turn, presupposes transparency of proceedings and credibility of policies; 
and there should be provision for the workers dismissed from the over-manned 
public enterprises. 
Deregulation  can be excessive and of the wrong kind. In the USA 
deregulation has led to the savings and loan crisis. The greed of the managers and 
owners, released from controls, harmed the depositors and taxpayers, who had to bail 
them out. Similarly in the case of the airlines, with their heavy investment in fixed 
assets, deregulation has led to cutthroat competition, bankruptcies, monopolistic Paul P. Streeten  362
practices and again bailouts and higher fares. When privatisation leads to private 
monopolies, regulation is essential.
17 
Too rapid trade liberalisation and currency convertibility can also be harmful 
as the East Asian crisis has shown. Eastern Europe can learn from East Asia how not 
only to “pick winners”, but also to create winners. We have seen that South Korea’s 
shipbuilding and steel industries, models of efficiency, were built with selective 
government support, without indigenous resources and initial skills. Efficient 
protection of promising industries, which later became successful exporters, has been 
the approach of Japan and South Korea. Efficient import substitution under 
protection has normally preceded successful exports. Rapid trade liberalisation 
captures only existing comparative advantage, confined to raw materials and 
industries with low values added. In order to gain a comparative advantage in high 
value-added industries (often the result of import-substitution of previously imported 
inputs for exports) and modern technologies government support has been essential. 
And success in exports is achieved not by relying only on the invisible hand (though 
international competition is a disciplining force), but by the strong supporting visible 
arm of government. Countries that are often cited as shining examples of free 
markets have powerfully and efficiently intervened in the allocation of investment 
(steering the private sector by differential interest rates, industrial policy and other 
interventions), have used a battery of import control and export incentives, and have 
had a large, efficient public sector. 
Decentralisation will be discussed in the next section.. 
Should economic reform (perestroika, restructuring for liberalisation) precede 
political reform (glasnost, democratisation) or the other way around? A priori, one 
might choose the latter, for political reform, involving granting negative freedoms, is 
easier to implement; and the goodwill created might then be mobilised for the 
implementation of the more difficult economic reforms. But the limited evidence that 
is available suggests that the former is preferable. China appears to have done better 
than Russia. Paradoxically, the transition from a centrally planned to a market 
economy requires strong state action in designing the market economy. Given the 
historical legacy of institutions and practices, the natural evolution of the market, as 
it occurred in Western Europe, cannot be relied upon. In a young democracy that is 
following autocratic rule, there are not yet enough powerful interests to push for the 
reforms. Only a strong, ruthless and perhaps undemocratic rule may be capable of 
resisting the privileged interests of the old order, who wish to undermine the efforts 
for change. 
I conclude that correctly phased gradual reforms on wide fronts are to be 
preferred in many situations to shock therapy; in spite of its risks; that economic 
17Albert (1993) writes: “In the US (and, to some extent in the UK), it is increasingly obvious that 
the major ‘winners’ in the drive to deregulate the economy have been the lawyers, for whom chaos in the 
airlines industry and bankruptcy among the savings and loan associations have been an unqualified 
boon…The USA now has more layers than farmers” (p. 10). Governance  363
liberalisation should precede political liberalisation; that institutional reform should 
precede stabilisation and stabilisation precede the freeing of markets, including 
foreign trade liberalisation. Wages should be freed last unless firm agreement on an 
incomes policy has been reached. 
There are lessons to be learned from the ex-socialist countries in transition for 
the developing countries. Both have tended to be over-regulated, and have suffered 
from ham handed government interventions and an excessively large public sector 
producing things.  Many developing countries have also suffered from a neglect of 
public action in basic social services. But simply introducing free markets may 
replace a government monopoly by a private one, often owned and run by foreigners. 
Institutional reform, including legal reform again should lay the foundations for a 
working competitive market. Where monopolies are inevitable or to be preferred, 
they should be made accountable and consumers’ voice should be made articulate. 
Educational reform, especially public action for girls and women, should have a high 
priority. For South Asia, where much human capital has already been created, 
stepping up savings and investment, and making the investment more productive, are 
among the main prerequisites of success.  The activities of the sate should be 
changed to produce an enabling environment for the private sector, to provide the 
physical, human and social infrastructure and the institutions.  Foreign  assistance 
and foreign investment can help to make the transition less painful and accelerate 
economic growth. As one official at a conference on the problems posed by 
capitalism’s victory over communism remarked, the choice boils down to Marshall 
Plan or martial law.
18 
The absence of civic traditions in post-Communist societies and developing 
countries alike may produce weak governments and economic stagnation. It is 
therefore important to build a civil society, a network of groups and voluntary grass-
roots organisations, clubs, guilds, cooperatives and other associations, that provide 
the soil for initiative, enterprise and economic prosperity. 
 
Decentralisation 
Decentralisation and devolution have become popular in Europe, against the 
principles of Napoleon and Stalin, Europe’s two great centralisers, France had been 
the most centralised state. The socialist government set up 22 regional governments 
with directly elected representatives since 1986. Spain devolved power to 17 
“autonomous communities” and Portugal did similarly. The regions spend 5.6 
percent of GNP, 90 percent of it directly passed on from central government taxes. In 
Italy, after the creation of new regional governments in 1970, local authorities are 
now acquiring the power to raise property, income and road taxes. Germany’s 
constitution grants a lot of power to the Länder. They have veto power on central 
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legislation through their seats in the Bundesrat, the upper house of Parliament. 
Eastern Europe now looks at Germany as its model. Norway, Sweden, Denmark and 
Finland, with a longer history of decentralisation, are experimenting. Local 
authorities can ask the central government to relax any control that they regard as 
inhibiting. It has become fashionable to talk in the European Community of a Europe 
des région, with direct contact between Brussels and regional governments.
19  
Decentralised government can be more responsive to citizens’ needs, can 
mobilise resources more readily, can, for some purposes, be more effective in 
achieving its objectives, can reduce costs, and can increase participation. But it also 
tends to aggravate regional inequalities, because the richer regions can raise more tax 
revenue and provide better services. And its advantages depend on a power structure 
in which access to power is widely distributed. Otherwise it can simply reinforce the 
grip of local power elites. It must also be confined to the appropriate areas of 
activity, and has to be supported by central action in others, e.g. monetary authority, 
human rights legislation and judiciary action. Those concerned with the fate of the 
blacks in Mississippi would not wish to decentralise power to that state. Strong 
central government legislation backed by the Supreme Court, combined with 
empowering the minority blacks in the state, is a better way to achieving their civil 
rights. The experience with basic democracies in Pakistan under Ayub Khan 
illustrates the dangers of decentralising power. The basic democrats were usually the 
large local landowners who were given more scope to exploit the poor. The 
Communist state in West Bengal also illustrates the success of strong (state) 
government action combined with participatory local organisations. 
 
The Civil Society 
States and markets do not exhaust the players in the game. Frequently, 
although they need each other, they also weaken and undermine each other. States 
damage markets by over-regulation, licensing, and bureaucratic red tape. Markets 
tend to corrupt governments through bribery, lobbying and logrolling. Therefore 
there is a need for the civil society. It can contribute to more constructive 
relationships between the two. 
Private voluntary organisations have come to play an increasing role, next to 
governments and profit-seeking companies. They comprise the most diverse 
organisations: religious, political, professional, educational, recreational and 
cooperative organisations, associations, clubs; pressure groups, and interest groups; 
institutions that are project-oriented, give technical assistance, provide disaster-relief, 
or are concerned with disaster-prevention, etc. Although they often claim to work 
without or even against governments, their contributions can sometimes best be 
mobilised by working jointly with governments. 
19The Economist, (August 1992, p. 51), An interesting plea for decentralisation to the states in the 
USA is made by Rivlin (1994) appointed Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget by 
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The most successful NGOs in the Third World, such as the Self-employed 
Women’s Organisation based in Ahmedabad, India, or the Grameen Bank or BRAC 
of Bangladesh, depend for their continuing and expanding (though not for their 
initial) operations on access to, and support and replication by, governments. Of 
course, in some situations their function is to criticise and exhort governments; or to 
fill gaps in government activities; or to do things at lower costs, with better results, 
and with more popular participation than governments. In other situations, when they 
promote their selfish interests, against the wider interests of the community, or when 
they reflect the dominant power of particular groups, government may be justified in 
trimming their influence. 
The relationship between NGOs and governments can be understood as one of 
cooperative conflict (or creative tensions), in which the challenge of the voluntary 
agencies and their innovative activities can improve both government services and 
the working of markets, and help to resolve tensions between them. 
In some situations the state plays a passive role, only responding to the 
pressures of interest groups. The outcomes will then be determined by the power of 
these groups, which in turn depends on their size, age, motivation, and enforcement 
mechanisms. In other cases the state is more active, imposing regulations and 
restrictions that can give rise to competitive rent-seeking by private interest groups. 
In yet other situations, both the private groups and the state work together for 
common objectives. 
Functions are divided between the state and civil society. The institutions of 
civil society—churches, trade unions, interest groups, action groups, the media and 
many others—are often quite undemocratic, in spite of their rhetoric. There is then a 
need for the empowerment of weak and neglected groups within them: women, the 
unemployed, ethnic minorities. There can be undesirable concentration not only of 
economic and political, but also of social power.
20 
The tendency to romanticise and glamorise the civil society is inviting, for it 
seems a way out of having to choose between the inefficient and sometimes corrupt 
public sector and the greedy, profit-seeking private sector, but it should be resisted. 
Though this sector can appeal to the highest faculties in people, such as devotion to 
the community, altruism, and selflessness, some of the worst characteristics are also 
manifested in some non-governmental organisations: the National Rifle Association, 
the Ku Klux Klan and the Mafia are also members of the civil society. 
Though there is in the early stages of development a need to strengthen both 
states and markets, in fact they often tend to weaken and undermine each other. It is 
the institutions of the civil society that can intervene and inhibit such weakening and 
undermining.
21 Interactions between the state, markets and civil society are complex. 
20Usually participation and democratisation are discussed only in the political domain. But the 
other three sectors, the private sector, the civil society and the familial society also need democratisation. 
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Some authors maintain that civil society is the reason why capitalism is necessary for 
democracy. But some autocracies, such as Bangladesh, had flourishing civil 
societies, while the democratic Prime Minister Mrs. Thatcher proclaimed that there is 
no such thing as society, wishing to destroy the civil society. Both too weak and too 
strong a state can discourage the growth of civil society. And too strong private 
political and ethnic organisations can undermine the power of the state, as in Sri 
Lanka or in Somalia or in Lebanon, or in the ex-Soviet Union, or in Yugoslavia, and 
can lead to the dissolution of society. 
 
The Politics of Aid 
Aid policies, just like domestic policies, are motivated by a mixture of 
political and commercial pressures, national interests, idealism and human solidarity. 
Military security, altruistic and Machiavellian motives and profit-seeking export 
interests inspire foreign assistance policies. To technical, economic and 
environmental conditionality has been added political conditionality about “good 
governance.” It would be one-sided to criticise national policies for being subjected 
to political constraints without looking at international efforts in the same light. And 
it would be remiss in making recommendations about the redirection of aid, not to 
say anything about how political constraints can be overcome. Business interests are 
behind the provision of inappropriate, capital-intensive technologies (tractors and 
combine harvesters to countries with large rural surplus populations), and the 
interests of consultancy and training firms behind the provision of inappropriate 
technical assistance. Denmark and Sweden have bought off the business lobby by 
earmarking a fixed percentage of the aid programme for programmes of interest to 
businesses and the donor country.
22 The answer to the pressures from consultancy 
firms and training institutions lies in decentralising technical assistance programmes 
to the donor offices in the developing countries. The local representatives who are in 
continual touch with the needs and people of the recipient countries are more likely 
to choose the right local people. 
The interests of banks that had lent to developing countries and are eager to 
have their debts serviced are clearly partly behind the switch in donor policies from 
project aid to programme lending. The policy conditionality that accompanies such 
lending is often based on the premature crystallisation of flawed orthodoxies. 
Unfortunately or fortunately, depending on whose point of view one takes, policies, 
like projects, are substitutable for one another, and it is sometimes not difficult to 
evade the conditions imposed in programme loans. 
It is often said that aid is inevitably given in the national self-interest of the 
donor country; it is just a branch of foreign policy. A lot depends, of course, on how 
narrowly or broadly national self-interest is interpreted. It is, however, noteworthy 
22See Mosley (1990). Governance  367
that countries like Holland, Sweden, and Norway, whose aid programmes are 
inspired by moral concerns of human solidarity, have given more aid, and of a better 
quality, than countries like the USA and the UK, which have defended aid in terms 
of national self-interest. Australia conducted a public opinion survey that showed 
that people regard development aid as an expression of human solidarity. 
Frequently NGOs and action groups agitate for more and better quality aid. 
Expanding the role of NGOs would help in reducing the bias in favour of large 
projects that create few jobs, and might raise aid effectiveness. To some extent this 
has occurred. The success of the World Development Movement in England in suing 
successfully the British Government and the Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd over 
the misuse of aid funds for the Pergau dam in Malaysia, which was linked to a large 
arms contract, is a good example. But NGOs might object to becoming too 
dependent on government funds and government objectives. This objection might be 
met by expanding government contributions to NGOs more slowly, so that they can 
keep in step with non-governmental contributions, and by permitting the NGOs to 
preserve their autonomy. 
Frequently the obstacles to restructuring aid policies to the priority sectors do 
not lie with outside pressure groups but have to be sought within aid ministries. 
Reducing conditionality would reduce the amount of work to be done by the donor, 
but would also reduce leverage. It could be replaced by actually giving aid only to 
those who have shown a commitment to human development policies, or who are 
intent on doing so in the future. Quiet signalling can be more effective than ham-
fisted conditionality imposed on unwilling recipients. 
An objection to supporting human development programmes consisting of 
basic education, primary health care, and family planning, that has sometimes been 
raised by aid ministries, is that they involve supporting recurrent expenditure, with 
the complaint that they present a bottomless pit, an indefinite donor commitment. 
The answer should lie in designing strategies with gradually growing recipient 
contributions, or with self-liquidating cost-recovery over a specified period. This 
may be accompanied by jointly working out new sources of tax revenue to finance 
the human development and anti-poverty projects (e.g. water, nutrition, basic 
education, preventive health services, family planning) for which cost recovery and 
user charges would be wrong. 
 
The Political Economy of International Support 
International and bilateral agencies can be mobilised both as pressure groups 
and as sources of finance for human development, including the respect for human 
rights, an important aspect of governance. Feeding and educating deprived children 
has a powerful appeal to human beings everywhere. A well-designed human 
development programme that benefits the poor in a poor country can count on 
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can be regarded as a public good. My satisfaction of being successful in this 
endeavour does not detract from yours. And providing each human being born into 
this world with the potential for the full development of his or her capacities is part 
of the enlightened self-interest of humankind. 
The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) has been a highly successful 
pressure group for protecting the poor, and particularly children and pregnant 
women, in the adjustment processes that had been initiated in the 80s. Since 1985 it 
has propagated the use of growth charts and growth monitoring, oral rehydration, 
breast feeding and inoculation as cheap and effective methods of dramatically 
reducing child mortality and improving children’s health. Through its book 
Adjustment with a Human Face, and through its dialogues with the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank, its pro-poor advocacy influenced the policies 
on conditionality of these two institutions and other donors so that they moved away 
from a merely technical, economic approach for stabilisation and balance of 
payments corrections, towards a more humane, compassionate approach, concerned 
with the human and social dimensions of stabilisation and adjustment. It also drew 
attention to the need and the political advantages of protecting the poor (by a form of 
compensation) from the burdens of adjustment. There were, of course, groups inside 
these institutions and in some developing countries that had been responsive to pro-
poor policies and that had been continuing the traditions of the basic needs strategy 
of the 70s. 
The success of UNICEF in getting governments to restructure their 
expenditure has been due not only to 
  (1)  the general appeal of improving children’s health; but also 
  (2)  the low costs at which substantial improvements can be achieved; 
  (3)  external financial support for these measures; and 
  (4)  the fact that they included many children in the middle-income groups. 
On the other hand, the political benefits to governments of the special 
campaigns that accompanied these drives may not be applicable to other areas with 
less public appeal, more narrowly aimed at the poor, fewer resources contributed by 
other sectors such as the military, and less external finance. 
Donors have funded programmes that compensate the poor during adjustment 
periods. The best known are the Bolivian Emergency Social Fund (ESF), started in 
1986, and the Ghanaian Programme of Action to Mitigate the Social Costs of 
Adjustment (PAMSCAD), which started in 1988. These are programmes of 
employment creation through local public works, credit creation and social services. 
They are mainly intended to be temporary and for workers dismissed from the tin 
mines in Bolivia and from the over-staffed public sector in Ghana. Local 
communities and NGOs play an important part in proposing and designing these 
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involvement and full delegation to local communities and private contractors. 
Another similar scheme is the Economic Management and Social Action Programme 
in Madagascar. It includes measures to provide drugs and support family planning. 
The projects are broadly targeted so as to gain wide political support. The World 
Bank is planning similar programmes for many other countries. 
The Bolivian and Ghanaian programmes have been criticised because the 
foreign funds were not additional to other aid, and in any case quite small compared 
with Bolivia’s debt service and the drop in the world price of Ghana’s principal 
export, cocoa. A second ground for criticism is that the poorest among the dislocated 
did not benefit. However, in countries like Bolivia and Ghana, with so many poor 
people, it is hard not to benefit some poor people with almost any scheme. A deeper 
criticism is that both projects are remedial to adjustment measures, whereas the 
desirable policy would incorporate human concerns right from the beginning in the 
very structure of the adjustment process. 
If a country that has in the past neglected egalitarian, human development 
intends to adopt reforms that promote it, it runs into short-term problems. These may 
take the form of heavy burdens on the budget and on administration, or of political 
discontent and riots by those who are likely to lose from the reforms. If there is 
redistribution of income to the poor, there is likely to be an additional impetus to 
inflation arising from the sectors producing goods (especially good) on which the 
poor spend their money, because their supply is inelastic in the short run. This may 
be accompanied by unemployment in the trades that had previously catered for the 
rich, because it takes time to shift resources. There may be a reduction in productive 
investment and balance of payments problems caused by additional food imports and 
capital flight, as the rich try to get their money out of the country. If the reform-
minded government replaces a dictatorship, previously oppressed groups will assert 
their claims for higher incomes, with additional inflationary results. If some groups 
become disaffected they may organise strikes, sabotage or even coups d’état. All 
these are familiar troubles for reform-minded governments that wish to change the 
course of policy in favour of the poor. They account for the regular disillusion after a 
honeymoon period. 
In such critical situations international aid agencies can help in making the 
transition less painful and disruptive, and more likely to succeed. They can help to 
overcome an important obstacle to reform—the fear that the cost of the transition to 
more appropriate policies is too high. They can add flexibility and adaptability to 
otherwise inert policies set on a damaging course. Structural adjustment loans have 
come to be accepted in other contexts, such as the transition to a more liberal 
international trade regime and more market-oriented domestic policies. By an 
extension of the same principle, adjustment loans should be given to the transition to 
a regime oriented more towards human development. They can take the form of 
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food aid or of international food stamps to support of a national nutrition 
programme. An international economic order built on international support of 
domestic efforts for human development, including good governance and poverty 
eradication is more sensible and more likely to succeed than one built on the hope of 
trickle-down effects and inter-governmental transfers. 
Combining development aid not only with the conventional conditions for 
policy reform (reduce budget deficits, reduce inflation, raise interest rates, devalue), 
but also environmental protection, poverty reduction, social objectives, political 
freedom, human rights and good governance has become popular among bilateral 
and multilateral donors. The concessionary component in the assistance buys, as it 
were, the policies that a purely commercial lender cannot insist on. In Zambia, for 
example, a housing subsidy was given to high-level bureaucrats who often did not 
pay even the small, subsidised rents they owed. The World Bank exercised pressure 
to raise the rents and use the revenue for sites and services schemes for the poor.
23 
It is controversial how desirable and feasible such conditionality is. Some 
observers have said that conditions can be successfully imposed only if the recipient 
government is in any case committed to the policies. Complaints have been voiced 
that conditionality impost by foreigners is intrusive, incompatible with national 
sovereignty, and can be counterproductive if it discredits domestic groups aligned 
with such reforms. It can also be evaded by substituting other undesirable policies 
for the ones eliminated by conditionality. The same objectives can be achieved by 
adopting a quieter style than imposing performance criteria, by supporting regimes 
determined to promote human development, withdrawing aid from those that do not, 
and thereby signalling unobtrusively to all recipients the conditions for receiving aid. 
Alternatively, institutional innovations might be considered that put a mutually 
trusted intermediary between donors and recipients, who would insist on the 
condition of poverty reduction, briefly discussed in the next section. 
It is important for conditionality on governance and human rights to 
distinguish between three types of what may be called negative human rights, 
leaving aside such positive rights as the right to education, health, food, etc. First, 
human rights in the narrow sense: not to be tortured; imprisoned without trial, etc. 
Second, civil rights, such as access to an independent judiciary; the rule of law. In 
Tudor England there was no democracy, but these rights were respected. Third, 
political rights, multi-party system, free elections, etc. The status of these three kinds 
is quite different. In the third, there is a danger that only Parliamentary or 
Presidential democracy is accepted, which may be inappropriate for some cultures. 
But human rights in the narrow sense are universally acknowledged. And I for one 
know with greater certainty that it is wrong to torture people than that an exchange 
rate is overvalued. Another question is whether the conditionality referring to 
23It should be noted that attempts at cost-recovery in squatter-upgrading projects showed that 
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governance and human rights is additional in two senses: (1) are the conditions 
added to other conditions? (2) are additional funds available if the conditions are 
met? Robert McNamara’s Redistribution with Growth and Basic Needs approaches 
in the 1970s were accompanied by additional money. 
 
Buffers between Donors and Recipients 
The question of monitoring aid, though it may appear to be a purely recording 
effort, does, however, raise policy issues. On the one hand, monitoring of poverty 
reduction and income distribution by donors is regarded by recipient countries as 
intrusive and perhaps even violating national sovereignty. On the other hand, donors 
believe that their responsibility to the taxpayer is to account for the use of aid funds 
and to ensure that poverty reduction is achieved, if this is the purpose of the aid. 
Donor institutions are distrusted by recipients, because they fear that extraneous 
criteria may enter into the process; and recipients’ institutions are distrusted by 
donors, because they may wish to conceal unsuccessful performance. To resolve this 
conflict it is necessary to design institutions that are trusted by both sides, and 
monitor reliably and objectively. 
In addition to having to gain the trust of both sides, and be responsive to their 
needs and demands, these institutions would have to fulfil the function of buffers 
between donors and recipients, would have to be sensitive to social and political 
conditions, and would have to have the expertise to judge the impact of programmes 
on poverty reduction. They should also be helpful in building up the indigenous 
capacity of poverty monitoring in developing countries. 
One possible solution would be to adopt the method that the Organisation of 
European Economic Cooperation (the forerunner of the OECD) practised under 
Marshall Aid. The USA generously withdrew from the monitoring process and 
encouraged European governments to monitor each other’s performance. 
Analogously, groups of developing countries, such as those of East Africa or of 
Central America, would get together, and one, say Uganda, would monitor the 
performance of another, say Kenya or Tanzania, and vice versa. Technical assistance 
would initially be needed to acquire or strengthen the professional capacity to do 
this. 
Another solution would be to appoint a mutually agreed council of wise men 
and women, with a competent secretariat, who would be performing the monitoring, 
possibly again combined with technical assistance for the strengthening of 
indigenous capacity. A third solution would be to aim at the creation of a genuine 
global secretariat, with loyalties to the world community, socially sensitive, and at 
the same time technically competent. The secretariats of existing international 
organisations such as the World Bank have not quite reached that point, and are not 
perceived by recipients as being truly global. Reforms in recruitment, training, and 
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institutions. Decentralisation with strong regional offices in daily contact with the 
local population and policy-makers would be necessary. 
Whatever institutional solution might be adopted, there is virtue in 
introducing a degree of competition into the monitoring process, so that a variety of 
methods may be tested against each other. At the moment it is feared that the large 
international financial institutions exercise a monopoly of power and wisdom, and 
propagate at times flawed prematurely crystallised orthodoxies. The proposed buffer 
procedures or buffer institutions should contribute to the building and strengthening 
of indigenous research and monitoring capacities of the recipient developing 
countries. For research on poverty and action against poverty tend to go together, as 
the investigations of Charles Booth and Seebohm Rowntree at the beginning of the 
century, and of Sidney and Beatrice Webb, of the World Bank, of the regional 
development banks, and of the Specialised UN Development Agencies have shown. 
 
Theories of the State 
We now have a menu of theories of the state to choose from. According to the 
one I was taught when an undergraduate, an idealistic, competent and well-informed 
government, like Platonic guardians, or perhaps more like Fabian bureaucrats, reigns 
above the conflicts of interest and promotes the common good. It is implicit in the 
writings of A. C. Pigou, Abba Lerner, Jan Tinbergen and James Meade. According 
to the this old romantic theory, the government can do no wrong. 
The opposite theory, represented by the new classical Chicago economists, 
neoclassical political economists and the public choice school (better named the self-
interest school), holds that the government can do no right. Citizens, politicians, 
bureaucrats and states use the authority of government to distort economic 
transactions for their benefit. Citizens use political influence and pressures to get 
access to benefits allocated by government; politicians use government resources to 
increase their hold on power; public officials trade access to government benefits for 
personal reward; and states use their power to get access to the property of citizens.
24 
The result is an inefficient and inequitable allocation of resources, general 
impoverishment and reduced freedom. 
A narrow interpretation of selfish political man (and to a lesser extent 
woman), pursuing ruthlessly his/her interests, can lead to mutual impoverishment. 
According to one version the predatory officials and bureaucrats or politicians 
promote actively their selfish quest for money or power, according to another they 
respond passively to powerful pressure groups so as to stay in power. “The model of 
government motivations” has been simplified “into a single-track form, supplying 
the public sector with a brain transplant straight out of the marketplace.”
25 Any 
24Grindle and Thomas (1991). 
25Lewis (1990). It should be noted that even in the market place individuals do not always behave 
selfishly. Governance  373
intervention by this “predatory state” with the “magic of the market place” is bound 
to make matters worse. Government action is not the solution (as it is in the first 
theory), it is the problem—“invisible feet stomping on invisible hands.”
26 As has 
been said above, while according to the Platonic theory the government intervenes in 
order to correct “distortions”, according to the public choice theory all distortions are 
due to government interventions. But according to both these apparently opposite 
views the state is an optimising agency. According to the Platonic view it optimises 
the welfare of the people as a whole, according to the public choice view that of 
special interest groups: those on whose support the politicians rely, the bureaucrats, 
the army, the politicians themselves. The Platonic view is normative (or naive); the 
public choice view crudely cynical.
27 
Even if it were true that politicians, bureaucrats and interest groups pursue 
always only their self-interest, this is open to different interpretations; some of these 
may be in conflict with one another and with the interests of others, others may be in 
harmony. There may, for instance, be a conflict between smaller present and larger 
future gains; or between “hot” impulsive and “cool” deliberated interests; or between 
concentrated smaller and more widely dispersed larger gains; or between certain 
smaller and uncertain larger gains; or, perhaps as important as interest conflicts 
between groups, the conflict between perceived smaller and actual but non-perceived 
larger gains. 
Amartya Sen pointed out in his Presidential address to the American 
Economic Association, on January 7, 1995, that one does not have to subscribe to 
either the “high-minded sentimentalism” the public servants constantly try to 
promote some selfless “social good”, or to the “low-minded sentimentalism” that 
everyone constantly is motivated entirely by personal self-interest, to assume that 
public servants have their own objective functions. To point to the need to fill in this 
gap in the theory of resource allocation does not imply assuming either Platonic 
guardians or homo economicus. 
A third theory, propounded by Anthony Downs and applicable only to 
democracies, holds that politicians maximise their own welfare by selling policies 
for votes.
28 Since not many (though a growing number of) developing countries are 
democracies, this theory would not have wide application among them, even if it 
applied to democracies. 
Then there are social contract theorists, from Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau to 
John Rawls and Mancur Olson. They say that citizens surrender some of their rights 
26Colander (1984). 
27In advocating maximum delegation to markets as morally neutral systems of coordination, the 
self-interest school also ignores the fact, pointed out by many authors, that markets presuppose 
generalised moral norms, and particularly trust. See, for example, Arrow (1971,1973). Platteau (1991) See 
also MacPherson (1984) and Hausman and McPherson (1993). 
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or liberties in return for protection against aggression, provision of collective goods, 
benefits from externalities, and other services from the state.
29 A limited sacrifice of 
individual autonomy—by increasing the prospects of avoiding related traps such as 
prisoners’ dilemmas, the isolation paradox, the free rider (and, worse, the sucker) 
outcome, and the tragedy of the commons—gives each citizen greater freedom and 
more benefits. The under-supply of public goods and the over-supply of public bads 
can be avoided by some enforced action by the central government. 
A more recent theory of the late Mancur Olson is based entirely on self-interest, 
which he equates with rationality and logic. Either a roving bandit becomes a 
stationary bandit and autocrat with a longer time horizon, or a majority in a democracy, 
acting entirely in their self-interest, levy taxes and supply public goods. He shows that 
the results are not very different from those that would follow from the actions of a 
benevolent dictator.
30 Poverty, mismanagement and strife follow from two conditions: 
first, the absence of secure and precisely defined property rights and, second, absence 
of predation by special interest groups that takes the form of special interest legislation, 
or regulation, or cartelisation or collusion to fix prices or wages. 
Marxist theory says that the government is the executive committee of the 
ruling class and always serves the economic interest of that class. But this is open to 
different interpretations. Some Marxists regard the state as acting in the interest of 
international, metropolitan capital, extracting surpluses from the periphery for the 
benefit of the centre. This is the view of neo-Marxist
31 dependency theorists and was 
Marx’s view of the relation of Ireland to England. Others regard the state as acting in 
the interest of an indigenous capitalist class, sometimes against the interest of the 
capitalists at the centre. According to both these views the state acts in the interest of 
a ruling class. A more sophisticated version of this theory holds that it is the function 
of the state to reconcile differences of interest within the ruling class, so as to 
maintain its power and the capitalist mode of production. According to this version it 
is possible for the government to impose measures in the interest of the exploited 
workers and small peasants, in spite of the loss of profit that this involves, if these 
measures save the system from revolt or revolution. It can also be that higher wages 
or a land redistribution, while reducing the profits of particular groups, raise total 
savings and/or lower capital-output ratios so as to increase the volume of the total 
surplus, though not the ratio of surplus to GNP. Others again regard the state as the 
agent of a “state class” or a bureaucracy. 
Palaeo-Marxists like Bill Warren
32 maintain that peripheral capitalism is a 
29Some countries, like Italy, give the impression that their citizens have entered with their 
governments into an anti-social contract: we shall not pay taxes, and in return we do not expect any public 
services. 
30Olson, Capitalism, Socialism and Dictatorship; Outgrowing Communist and Capitalist 
Dictatorships (undated, mimeo). 
31As so often, the prefix “neo” is a euphemism for old hat. 
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progressive, revolutionary force, making for productivity growth and economic 
progress. They illuminate Dudley Seers’s remark about the convergence of 
“Marxism and other neoclassical doctrines”.
33 And it is ironical that both 
neoclassical political economy and Marxism, two largely hostile and non-
communicating groups, conclude that thinking and research about government policy 
for poverty reduction or income redistribution are futile. According to both, the 
predatory state inevitably acts in its own interest and that of powerful pressure 
groups; there is no place for disinterested, benign, altruistic government policies; 
only the forces of the free market are capable of advancing the good of society.
34 
It is worth remembering, in the debate over market versus state, that real states 
fall under neither extreme. Dogmatism here leads to error even more than usual. A 
more commonsensical view, borne out by overwhelming evidence, holds that many 
governments are neither monolithic nor impervious to pressures for rational and 
altruistic policies. Moreover, if there is scope for a positive-sum game (as there is 
bound to be in the reversal of rent-seeking movements away from the Pareto 
frontier), and if the government can hold on long enough to tax this sum, the 
possibility of rational policies is opened up, even on the narrow assumption about 
predatoriness of the public choice school. 
The structure of government decision-making consists of many departments, 
ministries, and agencies, and many layers from central government via provinces (or 
states in a federation) to village or town councils.
35 Power in some countries is 
divided between the legislature, the judiciary and the executive. Each of these pulls 
in a different direction. The obstacle to “correct” policy-making is neither solely 
stupidity nor solely cupidity, neither just ignorance nor simply political constraints or 
monolithic selfishness.
36 On occasion, governments, like charitable foundations, 
universities or voluntary associations, do act disinterestedly and in the public 
interest, particularly, but not only, if there are pressure groups behind them. It is the 
existence of these pressure groups with some power or influence that constitutes the 
“trustees for the poor”, and the “guardians of rationality.”
37 Count Oxenstierna may 
33See Seers (1979). 
34Mancur Olson has shown that even utterly selfish autocracies with sufficiently long time 
horizons have a self-interest in providing order and prosperity and other public goods and in not exploiting 
their subjects excessively lest they kill the goose that lays the golden eggs. The outcome resembles that of 
a benevolent dictator. Capitalism, Socialism and Dictatorship, forthcoming. 
35See Lipton (1989). 
36Mancur Olson and others have built theories of government on the exclusive premise of self-
interested action by the autocrat or the majority, which he equates with “logical” and “rational”. Though 
parsimonious in assumptions and elegant in execution, the construction is artificial. 
37See Meier (1984). “The guardian of rationality” is Kenneth Arrow’s phrase for the 
economist; “trustees for the poor” is Gerald Meier’s. See Arrow (1974). Without these two groups 
there is no Archimedean point from which any political economy that endogenises politicians can lift 
itself out of full determinism and make room for the possibility of reform. If we accept determinism, 
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not have had the whole explanation, but knavery has no monopoly either.
38 
At the same time, there are areas in which a better analysis and a clearer sense 
of direction would help, just as there are areas where it is fairly clear what should be 
done, but vested interests, whether those of the policy-makers or of pressure groups 
on whose support they depend, prevent it from happening. Governments sometimes 
create rents and encourage rent-seeking; at other times they destroy rents and reduce 
wasteful competition in their pursuit. The private sector also creates and seeks rents. 
Some government officials act sometimes in their selfish interest; at other times the 
same ones and others are, or want to be seen as, moral agents, acting in the common 
interest. Some pressure groups, individual or collective, domestic or foreign, are 
motivated by reason, solidarity, and morality. 
According to this commonsense theory, for which is overwhelming evidence, 
the state does not optimise anything, neither public welfare nor self-interest. It 
compromises, attempts to resolve conflicts, manages bargaining between groups, and 
occasionally leads. Gunnar Myrdal’s notion of the South Asian “soft state”, in which 
declared policies are not implemented or not enforced, fits into this picture. But so 
does that of the East Asian hard state, which, having sets its face against the 
pressures of particular interests, pursues successfully both growth and equity. 
 
SOME POLICY CONCLUSIONS FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE 
 
For Governments 
Educate, train and instill the right attitudes for a competent civil service, willing 
and able to resist self-interested pressure groups and dedicated to serve the public. 
Build the right checks and balances for government, private sector, civil 
society and family, so that governments do not over-regulate firms, private firms do 
not corrupt government, and civil society does not destroy society, but makes 
government accountable. 
Provide opportunities for popular participation in decisions that affect the life 
and work of the people, access to power and transparency and accountability of those 
in power. 
Keep the macro-economy stable, avoiding inflation, large-scale unemploy-
ment and imbalances in the balance of payments. 
Enforce property rights and contracts. 
Encourage government interventions in order to (1) make free markets work 
efficiently, correcting for market failure, and (2) provide opportunities for the poor 
38Thomas Balogh dedicated his book The Dollar Crisis to Lord Lindsay of Birker, the Master of 
Balliol College, Oxford, “who never quite could convince me that Oxenstierna had the whole 
explanation…” Count Oxenstierna had written to his son in 1648 “An nescis, mi fili, quantilla prudentia 
regitur orbis?” (“Dost thou not know, my son, with how little wisdom the world is governed?”) Balogh, 
disagreeing with Lindsay, believed that it was knavery more than foolishness that was responsible for the 
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so that they can become self-reliant, correcting for iniquitous market “success”. This 
means giving the poor access to resources and power: land, food, health services, 
education, training, public employment, provision of public goods, credit, and a 
social safety net. 
Give higher priority in welfare policies to women and children over men, to 
rural over urban residents, to the poor over the better-off, and to neglected minorities 
discriminated against over the established majority. 
Always treat people as ends, never as production fodder only. 
 
For Donor Agencies 
Practise humility, adopt a quiet style in giving, avoid laying down hamfisted 
conditionality. 
Accept that there are different styles of development, of democracy, and of 
capitalism, and do not try to impose a uniform system of governance throughout the 
world. 
Remember that economics is not a science, that different circumstances call 
for different responses and listen. 
Devote a high proportion (say 20 percent) of aid to social priority sectors like 
nutrition, primary and secondary education, preventive rural health services, water 
and sanitation, family planning. 
Use development aid not to fill resource gaps or foreign exchange gaps, but to 
add flexibility to policy-making and reforms. 
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Paul Streeten has rightly emphasised the need for greater inter-face between 
national systems, civil society and the UN System. Indeed many scholars define civil 
society in terms of inter-face between the government, business and non-profit 
sector. I would rather opt for the more conventional definition of civil society as the 
non-profit sector. 
Within the operational sphere of the non-profit sector, the scope of Paul 
Streeten has focussed on the issue based organisations. At the informal level the 
influence of issue based NGOs has been conspicuous in many areas, particularly in 
matters pertaining to environment. The fate of Narbada Dam in India was sealed on 
the initiative of NGOs, for instance. Whether their role should be formalised is not a 
straightforward or simple matter. The developing countries are apprehensive about 
WTO’s recent interest in incorporating labour standards and environmental standards 
into its framework, because these can be used as expedient non-tariff barriers to 
block the exports from the developing countries. There is already evidence of this in 
the products involving child labour. These barriers might be strengthened if the 
NGOs are incorporated into the formal systems. One would be justified in asking the 
question how would the nexus of civil society and the UN System affect the trade 
and development of the developing countries? The answers to these question may 
provide the right perspective in making a judgement on Paul Streeten’s proposal. 
International trade already reflects unequal application of some of the basic 
principles. We are constantly reminded that subsidies distort or hinder the allocative 
role of the market mechanism and the developing countries should discard such 
practices—the sooner the better. Yet the pace of reduction in the direct and indirect 
subsidies to agriculture in the developed countries which exceed $250 billion, has 
been painfully slow. Another market distortion is the continued imposition of quotas 
in the textile trade. In the Uruguay Round the developed countries asked for a 10 
year time frame to deal with this problem and major reductions were scheduled 
toward the end of the period. 
The second theme of Paul Streeten that people under regimentation have 
seldom been able to do their best is unexceptionable in principle. Nevertheless one 
might remember that Singapore under Lee Kwan Yew, Korea under General Park, 
Taiwan under Chun, and China under Deng Siao Ping, registered impressive 
performance in the economic field; certainly better than many democratic countries. 
The third theme that the invisible hand of the market does not reach issues 
like rising unemployment and environmental degradation is unexceptionable. The Saeed Ahmad Qureshi  382
biggest market failure in the modern age is the collapse of the Russian experiment, 
where the suffering of the people have been compounded, efficiency levels are going 
down and the economy has been criminalised. Russian experience needs to be 
carefully analysed, particularly by the Western scholars who were the real authors of 
the new dispensation. 
His fourth theme on the need for self-regulation, in preference to external 
regulation deserves careful attention, but it needs to backed up by more research data 
on the experience of self-regulation in the developing countries. 
The fifth theme-devolution, is in line with the current thinking on governance. 
But a simplistic conclusion as to the efficacy of devolution as a cure for all ills, is not 
warranted, more so when devolution is conceived primarily in terms of transfer of 
legal powers. If this is not reinforced by growth of institutional capacity, 
transparency, a system of checks and balances and carefully worked mechanism of 
accountability, the results may be disappointing. 
As regarding adjustment lending, the impact of structural adjustment packages 
on growth, poverty alleviation equity and their relevance to recessionary situations 
has not been carefully examined. These questions are likely to assume growing 
importance in future. The role of volatile market and the disruptive character of 
short-term capital movements in times market uncertainty needs to be analysed in 
greater depth than has been the case. 
Finally his counsel to the donors, that there should be wider acceptance of the 
diversity in the styles of democracy and development, and that aid should be used 
not merely to fill the resource gap, but primarily to enlarge policy options deserves to 
be heeded. Indeed the ultimate test of the efficacy of aid may not be in terms of the 
saving gap or the foreign exchange gap, but in terms of their contribution towards 
enabling the recipients to realise their economic and human potential. Dr Streeten’s 
advice should fit well into such a broad framework. 
 
Saeed Ahmad Qureshi 
Formerly Deputy Chairman, 






Professor Streeten’s enlightening paper is a climax to the rising crescendo of 
learned wisdom on the subject of governance, the chosen theme of this conference 
which has been deliberated upon extensively by this meeting for the last four days. My 
comments on Professor Streeten’s comprehensive paper on “Governance Issues in 
Development Economics” will be considerably less incisive and detailed than what a 
more well-chosen discussant for the paper would have done. 
I share with Professor Streeten and many others in the conference the unease 
about defining governance. Professor Streeten has examined a number of definitions in 
his paper none of which appears to be quite acceptable to him. The one he chooses is the 
one proposed in the context of international cooperation by the late Professor Orlin. 
Streeten extends Orlin’s definition, but I feel rather uncomfortable with the term “civil 
society” used in this context. The thesaurus in the word processors does not have an 
entry for “civil society”, but it does give the following equivalent words: civilised, well-
behaved, respectful, refined, mannerly, polite, etc. I wonder if this is the kind of society 
which is likely to be much concerned about or is relevant to the problems of poverty, 
hunger, squalor, illiteracy, disease, crime, corruption, rape, and murder, which the 
proponents of the governance concept are keen to address. Isharat Husain, in his highly 
analytical paper, invokes the new theory of endogenous growth and mentions various 
empirical studies to prove that governance is good for growth and development; but so 
hard for many other variables. The point is that in economics everything is related to 
everything else, and finding co-relations among particular variables does not imply 
causation. I would like this to be given a concrete shape. My recent experience is related 
to the most successful development experience, the Agha Khan Rural Support 
Programme (AKRSP) in Pakistan. I am impressed with the high degree of achievement 
in the field of education. Not only is every school-going-age child, from 5–16, male or 
female, in school, they are receiving the best possible education, comparable to any in 
Pakistan. Even more surprising is the fact that parents are paying the fees of about Rs 
200 per child, and that enables the community to pay for the teacher. Although 
replicating it all over Pakistan may not be as easy, notwithstanding Mr Shoaib Sultan 
Khan’s optimism, this achievement has been possible only after the community has 
experimented with the highly motivated poverty alleviation programme. The 
*The above comments are the edited version of an oral presentation by the commentator as 
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endogenous growth models give primacy to the development of human resources in a 
poor country like Pakistan to increase the incomes of the poor.  
No one doubts the role of the organisation and of technical change, since the 
discovery of the magnificent Solow; that these two account for more than two-thirds of 
the growth in the industrial world. In this regard, I would like to refer to the recent 
interesting exchange of words in the Financial Times between the World Bank President 
James D. Wolfensohn and his highly respected Chief Economist, Mr Stiglitz, on the one 
hand, and two noted development economists, Professors Baghwati and Srinivasan, on 
the other. They have rekindled the debate on to how the political treatment of 
development issues  should be, and whether the trickle-down approach holds good. As 
happens in such debates, both sides are attacking the straw-men created by one and 
demolished by the other. But it does seem to me that the pendulum has swung in the 
other direction. The governance agenda has been pursued too far and it needs to be 
brought back to focus on the highly-needed great issues of development. This does not 
mean that we should forget about governance issues so successently analysed by 
Streeten, and these include a range of issues from local governance to global 
governance. My point is simply that if the evolution of civil society takes centuries or 
millennia, there is precious little the government of the day can do about it except taking 
the first necessary steps in that direction. Embarking on a tall agenda for governance at a 
time when many of the privileged position are still lurking about us is like putting the 
cart before the horse.  
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Islamabad. 
 